In a wide range of animal species, males coerce females to mate with them, either by physically forcing them to mate, by harassing them until they mate or by punishing persistent refusal to mate. The first section of this paper argues that the possibility of forced copulation can generate arms races between males and females that may have substantial costs to both sexes. In the second section, it is suggested that sexual harassment commonly represents a 'war of attrition' between the sexes; existing game theory models that may apply to sexual conflict over mating decisions are reviewed. The third section develops a simple prospective model for the evolution of intimidation by punishment in situations where males can raise the probability that females will accept their advances in future by punishing them for refusal to mate. Where the benefits of sexual coercion to males are high, all three male strategies may develop to a point where they have substantial costs to females. In the final section, evidence that female behaviour is adapted to minimizing these costs is reviewed.
In the great majority of animal species, males invest less in their progeny than females (Trivers 1972) . Males consequently have higher potential rates of reproduction (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1992) , the operational sex ratio is usually biased towards males (Emlen & Oring 1977) and males are the principal competitors for mates.
Interest in sexual selection has focused on two ways in which males compete for females: intermale competition for mates, including sperm competition; and male displays that encourage females to select them as mating partners. However, sexual competition can take other forms which can also have important evolutionary consequences. In particular, males may coerce females to mate with them and sexual coercion should probably be regarded as a third form of sexual selection, on a level with intra-sexual competition and inter-sexual mate choice (Smuts & Smuts 1993) .
There are three main forms of sexual coercion: (1) forced copulation, where a male uses superior speed or strength to catch and physically restrain a female while he copulates with her by force; (2) harassment, where repeated attempts to copulate by males have costs to females which induce them to mate immediately; and (3) intimidation, where males punish females that refuse to mate with them, thereby raising the chances that they will accept them as mates at some stage in the future.
There are theoretical reasons to expect that sexual coercion will be widespread and may often have high costs to females, although in some cases the usual sex roles may be reversed. In this paper, we review areas of theory relevant to these three male strategies. The first section considers forced copulation and argues that, where this is feasible, it may generate arms races that have substantial costs to both sexes. In the second section, we suggest that sexual harassment commonly represents a 'war of attrition' between the sexes, reviewing existing game theory models that may apply to sexual conflict over mating decisions. Like forced copulation, harassment can be expected to evolve to a point where it has substantial costs to males as well as to females. The third section considers the evolution of sexual intimidation. The evolution of social strategies where one individual imposes a cost on another in order to gain a deferred benefit has strong analogies with the evolution of reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1972; Oliver 1980; Boyd & Richerson 1992 
